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ABSThC
Theresponse of interest rates to money announcement surprises is
examined both theoretically and empirically in this paper. In the
theoretical models developed, not only changes in operating procedures,
but also reserve requirement systems, are found to potentially affect
the response. Moreover, under the current two—week contemporaneous
reserve requirements (CRR) adopted in February 1984, the responses in the
first and second weeks of the two—week reserve maintenance periodmay
differ. The empirical results generally conform to the predictions of
the theoretical models. The response of the Treasury bill yield to
money announcement surprises changed significantly following changes
in either operating procedures or reserve requirement systems in
October 1979, October 1982, and February 1984.
V.Vance Ibley
Department of Finance DJ-lO
Graduate Sthool of Business
Administration
University of Washington
Seattle, WA 98195The larger responses of interest rates to weekly money announce-
ments following the Federal Reserve's change in operating procedures on
October 6, 1979, are well documented. Both Roley (1982, 1983) and
Cornell (1983a) estimate increased responses of Treasury bill yields
following October 1979, and Cornell (1983a) provides initial estimates
of similar increases for long—term yields. Loeys (1985) presents evid-
ence that the response once again declined, perhaps coinciding with the
Federal Reserve's announced change in operating procedures in October
1982. A further change potentially affecting the response of interest
rates to money announcements was made in February 1984, when contempor-
aneous reserve requirements (CRR) replaced lagged reserve requirements
(LRR). In the eight months following the adoption of CRR, Gavin and
Karamouzis (1984) estimate responses smaller than those in the preceding
period.
While most explanations of the estimated responses of interest
rates to money announcement surprises rely on informal models, several
theoretical frameworks have been advanced. Urich (1982) presents a
model of the policy anticipations effect emphasizing the role of the
Federal Reserve's monetary target rule or reaction function. The model
also assumes the federal funds rate (or money market conditions) operat-
ing procedure along with fixed commodity prices. As a result, real
interest rates change in response to money announcement surprises.
Nichols, Small, and Webster (1983) also emphasize the effects of persist-
ent money demand shocks and the Federal Reserve's desire to offset such
shocks. In this model, however, the money stock is assumed to be con-
trolled directly. In contrast to these approaches, Siegel (1985) speci-
fies a model in which money announcement surprises provide information—2—
about economic activity)' Finally, Roley and Walsh (1985) introduce
factors such as reserve requirements and different operating proced—
ures in explaining both pre— and post—October 1979 responses. More-
over, despite the skepticism of Cornell (l983b), Shiller, Campbell,
and Schoenholtz (1983), and Hardouvelis (1984), the significant esti-
mated responses of long—term interest rates are found to be consistent
with the policy anticipations hypothesis. Roley and Walsh (1985) also
show, however, that the expected inflation hypothesis is consistent
with the estimated response of the term structure. In this case, com-
modity prices adjust instantaneously to news about the money stock.
The purpose of this paper is to develop theoretical models of
the response of interest rates to money announcement surprises under
alternative operating procedures and reserve requirement systems, and
then to examine their empirical implications. In addition to the fed-
eral funds rate and nonborrowed reserves operating procedures investi-
gated by Roley and Walsh (1985), the so—called borrowed reserves pro-
cedure ——presumablyin affect since October 1982 ——alsois examined.
Moreover, the effect of the switch from CRR to LRR is considered.
Nichols and Small (1985) suggest that this change could increase the
observed responses.
In the first section, a model of the response of interest rates
to money announcement surprises under LRR is presented. The model is
then used to examine the implications of the federal funds rate, non—
borrowed reserves, and borrowed reserves operating procedures. In the
second section, models are specified under a hypothetical one—week CRR
system as well as the current two—week CRR system. The effects of
alternative operating procedures again are compared in these models.—3—
Empirical results of the response of interest rates to money announce-
ment surprises for various subperiods from September 1977 through May
1985 are presented in the third section. In the fourth section, the
main conclusions are summarized.
I.RESPONSE UNDER LAGGED RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
In this section, the basic model used in investigating the
responses of interest rates to money announcement surprises is first
presented.While this model is specified assuming lagged reserve
requirements,it isadapted easily in the subsequentsection where CRR
is considered. Following the presentation of the basic model, the
responses of interest rates under alternative operating procedures in
the presence of LRR are derived and compared. Many of the intermediate
steps also are relevant to subsequent models which assume CRR.
A. The Model
The theoretical framework used here is based on that presented
by Roley and Walsh (1985). Areas in which major differences occur are
noted below. At the outset, however, it is useful to note that the
model is specified as linear in levels, while Roley and Walsh (1985)
specify a log—linear model. The linear—in—levels model is particularly
useful when the current 2—week CRR system is examined.
Each version of the model is comprised of the Federal Reserve's
policy rule, the demand for money, a term—structure relationship, and
the demand for and supply of reserves. The Federal Reserve's policy
rule is represented as'
M+ =(l+g)M + (1_A)l+i [E(M_1lc)_(l+g)''
(1)
j=O,l,2,...—4—
Equation (1) represents the Federal Reserve's short—run target path
for the level of nominal money, (j=O,l,2,...). It depends on
the base level of the nominal money stock set n—weeks previously,
M, and the long—run growth rate target, g. The second term on
the right—hand side of (1) represents the expected deviation of the
previous week's money stock from its long—run target value, subject
to the Federal Reserve's information set, Policymakers offset
deviations from the long—run target according to the short—run adjust-
ment parameter, A. If A=l, the short—run target always corresponds to
the long—run target. If A=O, the previous week's expected deviation
from target is fully accommodated. If 0 <A<1,the short—run path
will eventually become arbitrarily close to the long—run path. In the
long run, then, expected inflation is constant since long—run money
growth is unchanged. As a result, there is no inconsistency in assum-
ing that expected inflation is constant in the long run. If commodity
prices are perfectly flexible, however, expected inflation over shorter
periods would change depending on the short—run money target paths.
Such perfect short—run price flexibility is not assumed in the model.
Thus, the response of interest rates to money announcement surprises is
modeled with the policy anticipations effect.
The demand for money in week t also is specified in termso nom-
inal levels, and it is represented as
Nta0_a.i+u, (2)
The opportunity cost of holding money is represented by the federal funds
rate, i, for simplicity.F The parameter representing the interest rate
responsiveness of money demand, a, is assumed to be positive, and the
constant term, a0, is assumed to embody effects from the price level and—5--
GNP. These latter variables are not explicitly considered here.
Because equation (2) represents weekly money demand, the random
disturbance u is likely to exhibit a high degree of serial correlation.-'
To model this in a simple way, assume
U = + < (3)
where c is a white noise process.
To represent long—term yields, an expectations model of the term
structure is employed. It is assumed that the h—week rate, rh depends
on the average of the current week's federal funds rate, i, and expected
future levels of the federal funds rate. Formally, the term structure
relationship is represented as
rh =(l/h).i+ (lIh) E(it+It). (4)
The remaining relationships to be specified involve the market for
reserves. The demand for total reserves under LRR is
TR =RRt+ERt =kMt2+ Vt, (5)
which equals the sum of required and excess reserves. In turn, this sum
is represented by the reserve requirement ratio k, multiplied by the
level of the money stock occurring two weeks ago under LRR, plus a random
error term, w. This random error term is further assumed to exhibit
first—order autocorrelation
=e.w1+ 101<1 (6)
and it may be viewed as a disturbance related to money multiplier errors.
While this error term does not play a major role in analyzing the impact
of money announcements under LRR, it is important when CRR is examined.-—6—
Finally, the supply of total reserves is represented as
TR =NBR
+ b0 + b(i —d)+ Vt, (7)
where BRt =b0+ b(i —d)+ v. (8)
The supply of total reserves equals the sum of nonborrowed (NBR) plus
borrowed (BR) reserves. In turn, borrowed reserves are a function of
frictional borrowing, b0, and the positive spread between the federal
funds rate and the discount rate, d. The remaining variable,
represents a mean—zero random error term, assumed to be serially uncor—
related for simplicity. In addition, the errors £, e, and V are
assumed to exhibit zero contemporaneous correlation.
Combining the demand for and supply of reserves, (5) and (7),
equilibrium in the reserves market can be represented as
kMt2 + w =NBRt+ b0 + b.(i —d)+ Vt. (9)
Note that in the reserves market, there is not a direct link between the
current federal funds rate, 1, and the current week's money stock, Mt.
Instead, the current federal funds rate depends on the level of the
money stock two weeks ago. As a consequence, all of the operating pro-
cedures discussed below in this section essentially operate through the
demand for money..1
Regardless of the type of operating procedure, the Federal Reserve
sets the short—run target path for money (1) by first predicting the
level of the money stock in the previous statement week. Policymakers
are assumed to know the level of the money stock in the statement week
before last, M2. when the short—run path is set. This value also
corresponds to the level of the money stock announced in the current week.
From the demand for money (2), policymakers then solve for the implied
path of the federal funds rate. The next step depends on the particular
operating procedure.—7—
In assessing monetary policy at the beginning of a statement
week, it is assumed that the public's information set only differs from
the Federal Reserve's by the information contained in the weekly money
announcement. The public's information set before the money announce—
b a ment is denoted as Q., and after the announcement as 'whichincludes
Mt2. The Federal Reserve bases policy at the beginning of the week on
c.
Given these assumptions, the unanticipated component of the money
announcement can be calculated. From (2) and (3), the public's expecta-
tion of the announced value of money stock Is
E(M2!Q) =a0
—a.i2+ + st—V (10)
The public observed t2 two weeks ago, and discoveredu3 during the
previous week's money announcement. Thus, from (10), the money announce-
ment surprise equals
Mt2 —E(Nt2lc)
=M..2 = 6t—2' (11)
where M2 denotes unanticipated money. Non—zero values of cause the
public to reassess the short—run money path (1), and possibly the current
week's federal funds rate depending- on the operating procedure.
1. Federal Funds Rate Response
The response of the federal funds rate to a money announcement sur-
prise depends on the particular operating procedure in affect. Under the
federal funds rate (FFR) procedure, the Federal Reserve is assumed to set
the federal funds rate according to
=i+ n, (12)
where is the level of the federal funds rate consistent with the short—
run money target path (1), and n represents any discretionary changes—8—
relevant to statement week t. It also is assumed that E(nIQ) =0.
That is, the public observes i, but it cannot observe or infer i until
after the money announcement7 Because the Federal Reserve setsi at
the beginning of the week and maintains this level throughout the week,
the money announcement surprise (11) has no affect:
i—i=O, (13)
where i and i represent the federal funds rate before and after the
money announcement, respectively. To keep the federal funds rate con—
stant in response to the money announcement surprise, nonborrowed
reserves are changed by (kIb)2 as may be seen by combining (9), (11),
and (13).!'
Under the nonborrowed reserves (NBR) procedure, policymakers use
i' to solve for the target level of NBRt from (9). Again, this recurs—
sive structure follows from LRR. As before, a discretionary component is
allowed, so that actual nonborrowed reserves during the week can be repre-
sented as
NBRt =NBR+ (14)
where E(Pjc2) =0.Also, following Roley and Walsh (1985), the public is
assumed to observe NBRt. An alternative assumption is adopted below
following Nichols and Small (1985), who suggest that money announcements
provide information about the supply of reserves.
Under these assumptions, the response of the federal funds rate to
money announcement surprises can be determined from (9), (11), and (14):
.a .b u '
—= (k/b).c2(k/b).N2.
(15)
In this case, a positive money announcement surprise causes the expected
aggregate demand for total reserves (5) to be revised upwards. Given—9—
that nonborrowed reserves are constant, the reserves market must clear
through an increase in borrowing, which exerts upward pressure on the
federal funds rate.
Nichols and Small (1985) characterize the response of the fed-
eral funds rate under the NBR procedure somewhat differently. They
suggest that the federal funds rate responds to money surprises because
of the new information provided about the supply of reserves. Again





which includes both reserves demand and supply effects.2' Implicit in
(16) is the notion that the public does not observeNBRt in week t. For




That is, changes in the expected level of nonborrowed reserves reflect
reassessments about the nonborrowed reserves target path. Using the
policy rule (1), the expected demand for money in week t from (2), and










Theresponse of the federal funds rate is not unambiguously positive in
this case. However, the greater the persistence of money demand shocks
(p), and the more the Federal Reserve offsets deviations from itsmoney— 10—
target(A), the larger the response. In any event, the model can easily
handle this case. In what follows, the informational assumptions about
reserves adopted by Roley and Walsh (1985) will be maintained.
The borrowed reserves (BR) procedure is the final operating pro-




where is again a discretionary weekly component, entered with a minus
sign to make it consistent with that introduced for the NBR procedure.
To implement the BR procedure under LRR, the Federal Reserve again deter-
mines the target level of the federal funds rate as before. From this
value, the target level of borrowed reserves is determined from (8). The
Federal Reserve then offsets all movements in the federal funds rate dur-
ing the week except those from errors in the borrowings function,v, by
changing nonborrowed reserves. Thus, actual nonborrowed reserves during
week t equal
NBRt =E(NBRtb)++ k2 + w. (21)
To the extent that the money announcement surprise is not fully offset as
in (21), the federal funds rate could respond. In the absence of this
behavior, however, movements of the federal funds rate during the week
correspond to —b.v, which is independent of the money surprise. As a
result, the federal funds rate response under a pure BR procedure should
coincide with that of the FFR procedure (13).— 11—
2.Term Structure Response
The response of expected future levels of the federal funds rate
is independent of the particular operating procedure used by the Federal
Reserve. This is because policy is initially based under all operating
procedures on the federal funds rate and its affect on money demand.
Even in the current week under the NBR procedure, the observed federal
funds rate is expected to be the target level until shocks becomeapparent.
Consider the response of the expected federal funds rate in some




From this expression, the response of the expected federal funds rate may






Using (3), the second term on the right—hand side of (23) equals J+2e2,
which represents the persistence of the money demand shock in week t—2.
The first term on the right—hand side depends on the assessed change in
the short—run money path due to the new information about the money stock




In turn, the revision in the assessment of the previous week's money stock






Combining (23), (24), and (25), the response of the expected future fed-
eral funds rate is
E(it+.IQ)-E(i+.lc)
=(l/a)[p2-(l-XYp].M2 (26)
which has an interpretation analogous to that of (19). Finally, using
(26) along with (4), the response of the term structure is
- =(l/h)(i-i)+ (1/h) (l/a)[p2
-(lA)p]. M2 (27)
Given unchanged model parameters, the term structure response across
regimes only differs by the first term. For long—term rates, the
responses are approximately the same. However, Roley and Walsh (1985)
found that parameters changed across the FFR and NBR procedures, and
such changes were evident under both the policy anticipations and
expected inflation hypotheses.-'
II.RESPONSEUNDER CONTEMPORANEOUS RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
The responseof interest rates to money announcement surprises under
CRR is examined in this section. The response is first analyzed undera
one—week CRR system, which includes many of the factors relevant to the
two—week CRR case. Then, the two—week CRR system is examined. In both
versions of CRR, the reserve computation and maintenance periods are
assumed to coincide. Allowing differences of one or two days in these
periods should not matter in terms of the effects of money announcements,
while these short lags may be important in other applicationsinvolving
the end of the reserve maintenance period.— 13—
A.One-Week CRR
Under one—week CRR, the demand for reserves depends on the current
week's money stock, Mt. To reflect this change, equation (5) is respeci—
fied as
DTR =k.M+ w. (28)
Even at this stage, some important differences between the LRR and one—
week CRR specifications are apparent. Of primary importance is the fact
that the model loses its recursive structure. In particular, equilibrium
in the reserves market implies a positive relationship between the cur-
rent money stock and the current federal funds rate:
kM + =
NBRt+ b0 + bi —b.dt+ Vt, (29)
which is obtained from (28) and (7).
In setting policy, the Federal Reserve again starts by using the
policy rule (1) to find target values for the money stock. Then, given
these target values, the monetary authority sets one of its instruments ——
eitheri, NBRt, or BRt ——fromequilibrium values in the money market
obtained by combining money demand (2) and supply (29) for the current
and future weeks.
In forming assessments about expected money under CRR, the public
uses the equilibrium expression for the money stock, found by combining






which combines money demand and supply errors.— 14—
Asindicated in (30), a portion of these errors is predictable under
CRR. In particular, the equilibrium expression for the federal funds
rate in week t—2 also depends on these errors. Since the value of
the federal funds rate in week t—2 was observed, a linear combination
of the errors is known'
6t-2 =ak+bt—2 + 'ak+b )et2 (31)
Using (31), the linear least squares estimates of s2and e2 are
E(E Qb) =(ak+b)kc3*










2denote the unconditional variances of 6 and e
C e t—2 t—2
respectively. From (31), (32), and (33), the money announcement
surprise (30) reduces to
M -E(M Qb) =Mu =C -E(E çb) (34) t—2 t—2 t t—2 t—2 t—2 t
Theobservedlinear combination of the errors (31) serves to eliminate their
independence. That is, given 6t—2' high values of 6t2 imply low values
of e ,andvice versa..
t— 2
1.federal Funds Rate Response
Under the FFR procedure, the monetary authority finds i' using th
method outlined above. As before, this level of the federal funds rate,
perhaps including a discretionarycomponent, is maintained throughout the— 15—
week.Thus, the federal funds rate does not respond to money announcment
surprises, as in (13).
Under the NBR procedure, the Federal Reserve uses the expression
for the equilibrium value of money to solve for the level of nonbor—
rowed reserves consistent with the target level of the money stock from
(1). From the equilibrium expression for the federal funds rate, which
can be solved by combining (2) and (29), and using the information about
money demand and supply errors (31), the response of the federal funds rate
to money announcements is
.a .b k2 2u -
1t
=ak+b-8 )M_2 (35)
where is defined as in (34). In comparison to the LRR case (15), the
response of the federal funds rate under the NBR procedure with one—week
CRR is unambiguously smaller. Because of CRR, the response depends on the
autocorrelations (p and 8) of money demand and supply errors. The response
also is smaller under CRR due to the offsetting affects of money demand and
supply errors.
Under the BR procedure, thq Federal Reserve finds the target level
of the money stock as before, along with the implied nonborrowed reserves
target from the equilibrium expression for money implied by money demand
(2) and supply (29). From the equilibrium expression for i, also found
using (2) and (29) the implied target level of the federal funds rate,
is determined. Then, the target level for borrowed reserves is
obtained from the borrowings function (8). As before, it is assumed that
the federal funds —discountrate spread is used to hit the borrowings
target. Under CRR, the federal funds rate again only fluctuates in response
to borrowings function errors, v, but at a reduced amount equal to _(l/ak+b)vt.— 16—
Thus,under one—week CRR, the BR procedure should yield less volatility
in the federal funds rate than under LRR. Moreover, the federal funds rate
again does not respond to money announcement surprises in this case as
long as all errors except v are accommodated.
2. Term Structure Response
To consider the response of the term structure to money announce-
ment surprises under one—week CRR, the same policy rule as before is
assumed. In particular, the changed assessment about the short—runmoney
path is given by (24). Based on the new information about Mt2 the pub-




1 +akB)M" () ak+b t—2
which is obtained from the equilibrium solution forMt_i and the information
about money demand and supply errors (31). Fromequilibrium in the money
and reserves markets, changes in the expected nonborrowedreserves and federal
funds rate paths also can be derived. For nonborrowedreserves, the change
can be represented as
E(NBR2a) —E(NBR 1gb) =(ak+b)[E(M JQa) —E(M t+j t t+jt a t+j t t+jt
—
()[E(u+.JQa)
—E(u ç2b)] t+j t
+[E(w.Jc) -E(w çb)] (36) t+j t
Inturn, the response of the expected future federal fundsrate is
E(i+.Ic2)
—E(i+F&)





+ (+b)[E(w I) —E(w1b)} (37) t+j t t+jt— 17-
Combining(24). (35), (36), and (37), the response of the expected federal
funds rate in week t+j is
E(i.I) -E(i.!c)=t- (bp +akO)].MU2. (38)
The first terminthe brackets on the right—hand side is identical to that
of (26), and it reflects the effects of persistent money demand shocks. The
second term is the Keynesian liquidity effect. If the short—runmoney path
is raised through positive money shocks, future interest rates will be lover
than before. The effect on the term structure can be solved using (4), and
the net response depends on the difference of the above two effects
along with the response of the current week's federal funds rate.
Comparing (38) to (26), the response to money announcement surprises is
larger under CRR if p—O>O, and vice versa.
B. Two-Week CRR
The linear form of the model presented thus far is particularly
advantageous when investigating a two—week CRR system such as that
adopted in February 1984. In this case, the only change involves the










whichis specified for nonoverlapping two—week periods.
The Federal Reserve is assumed to implement policy in the same
basic way as under one—week CRR. To investigate this case, it is
assumed that the public expects CRR to be satisfied subject the random
error, in both weeks of the reserve maintenance period. In the
second week, however, errors from the first week have an affect not
only through their use in predicting the current week's money stock,
but also through the two—week averages of the demand for and supply of
reserves.
1. Federal Funds Rate Response
Under both the FFR and BR procedures, the implementation of mone-
tary policy closely follows the steps outlined in the presence of one—
week CRR. Again, the federal funds rate does not respond to money
announcement surprises under either procedure. For the BR procedure,
however, the lack of response depends on the Federal Reserve accommoda-
ting all shocks through changes in nonborrowed reserves, except borrow-
ings function errors, v. To the extent that some shocks are not fully
accommodated, the response of the federal funds rate may resemble that
presented below for the NBR procedure. In any event, the implications
of two—week CRR are developed more fully when the NBR procedure is ana-
lyzed.
Under the nonborrowed reserves procedure, the federal funds rate
response differs across weeks depending on the week of the reserve main-
tenance period. To start, assume that announced money, is for the
second week of a reserve maintenance period. Combining reserve demand
(39) with reserve supply (7) averaged over the reserve maintenance period
implies— 19—
k(1/2) (M2 + M3) + (1/2) (wz +w3)
=(l/2).(NBR2+ NBR3)
+ b0 + (1/2).b.i2 + (l/2).b.i3
—bd+ (1/2) •v2 + (1/2)v3. (40)
Solving(40) for i2 and substituting into (2) specified forN2 yields
equilibriummoney in week t—2. Using this relationship along with (31), the
moneyannouncement surprise can be shown to be the same as that derived tinder
one—week CRR, equation (34). This follows because the public knows the
values of all variables in (40) exceptM2 and w2, as was the case
with one-week CRR.
The response of the current week's federal funds rate can be found
by first solving for the equilibrium level of the funds rate from (2),
(3), and total reserve supply for week t (7), where week t also corre-
sponds to the second week of a reserve maintenance period. From the
expression for the equilibrium federal funds rate, the response to the










2indicates that week t is the second week of a reserve mainten-
ance period. From (41), the money announcement not only affects the fed—
eral funds rate through revisions in the current week'smoney demand and
supply errors, u and w, but also through revisions in the assessments
about the previous statement week's money stock level andmoney supply— 20—
error.If either of these latter two magnitudes are revised upward, the
federal funds rate rises since reserve demand during the two—week period
is higher than previously expected, and reserve requirements must be sat—
ified by the end of the second week. Given that the market observes1t2
however, the effects of these errors are not independent. In particular,
analogous to the one—week CRR case, the interdependence is described by
(3i).
Using (3)5 (6), and (31), the reassessments about the money demand and
supply errors in (41.) can be evaluated as before. Since week t—l is the
first week of a reserve maintenance period and the public expects CRR to
be satisfied during both weeks, the revision in the expected money stock
in the previous week is given by (35). As a consequence, the response
of the federal funds rate is
-,2akb2 -82)+ (akb)(P_0)]•N2• (42)
In comparison to the one—week CRR case (35), the response to money announce-
ment surprises is larger during the second week of a reserve maintenance
period if p—O>0, and vice versa.
Now consider the response of the federal funds rate when the money
announcement is in the first week of a reserve maintenance period. In
this case, the money announcement surprise again corresponds to (34), the
surprise under one—week CRR. As before, this follows since the public
expects reserve requirements to be satisfied during each week of the
reserve maintenance period. Similarly, the federal funds rate response is
given by (35), the response under one—week CRR. That is, during the
first week of a reserve maintenance period, the previous week's errors— 21—
donot play a direct role in satisfying the current period's reserve
requirements, in contrast to the previous case. Therefore, under the
NBR procedure, two—week CRR implies that the response of the federal
funds rate to money announcement surprises is larger in the second
week of a reserve maintenance period if p—O>O. Moreover, the response
in the first week of the reserve maintenance period is smaller than that
under LRR (l5))'These same results hold for the BR procedure if nonborrowed
reserves are not changed to accomodate money announcement surprises.
2. Term Structure Response
Under two—week CRR, the response of expected future spot rates
again does not depend on the particular operating procedure used. The
response also does not depend on the week of the reserve maintenance period.
To examine this case, first consider changes in the assessments about the
previous week's money stock, Mt_i, which play a key role in determining
the term structure response through the monetary policy rule (1).
When weeks t—2 and t are the second weeks of reserve maintenance
periods, Mi is the money stock for the first week of a reserve mainten-
ance period. Thus, the revision in the assessment of Mt_i is given by (35),
and the response of expected future levels of the federal funds rate is
given by (38), the same as one—week CRR.
When weeks t—2 and t are the first weeks of reserve maintenance
periods, Mi is the money stock for the second week. In this case,
it may seem that information about M2 should have a different impact
on assessments of Mt_i than before because reserve requirements must be
satisfied by the end of the second week. This differential impact is,— 22—
however,negated due to the information about money demand and supply
errors contained in the federal funds rate in week t—2 (31). As a
consequence, it can be shown that the revision in the assessment of
Mt_i is again given by (35), and the response of expected future levels
of the federal funds rate is represented by (38) as before.
Combining the response of expected future spot rates with that
of the current federal funds rate using (4), the response of h—week
interest rates under the FFR procedure is larger for two—week CRR than
LRR if p—O>O, and vice versa. Moreover, the response under two—week
CRR is the same across reserve maintenance weeks. Under the NBR
procedure, the term structure response is larger during the second week
of a reserve maintenance period than the first week if p—O>O due to
the larger response of the current federal funds rate. In this case,
the h—week yield's response in the second week is larger by
Under the BR procedure, the response again depends on whether the federal
funds rate—discount rate spread is strictly used to hit the borrowings
target. If the spread is used, the term structure response coincides
with that of the FFR procedure. Alternatively, if nonborrowed reserves
are not changed to offset the effects of money announcement surprises,
the response under the BR procedure coincides with that of the NBR
procedure.— 23—
III.EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The models developed in preceding sections yield several testable
hypotheses about the response of interest rates to money announcement
surprises. First, under the FFR procedure in effect prior to October
1979, the federal funds rate should not respond to money announcement
surprises. Second, following the implementation of the NBR procedure
in October 1979, the federal funds rate should exhibit a positiveresponse,
and in this case the response of the term structure should be larger than
before. Third, from October 1982 to February 1984, when the BR procedure
was used under LRR, the response of the federal funds rate depends on
whether nonborrowed reserves were changed to accommodatemoney announce-
ment surprises. If the federal funds —discountrate spread was exclu-
sively used to hit the borrowed reserves target, the federal funds rate
again should not respond. In this instance, the term structureresponse
also would be less than in the October 1979 —October1982 period. Fin-
ally, since February 1984, when the BR procedure was used under CRR, the
response of interest rates again should change, with the direction depending
on the relative size of the autocorrelations of money demand and supply
errors. Moreover, the response also could depend on the particular week
of the two—week reserve maintenance period. These hypotheses are examined
below, following brief discussions of the empirical specification and
data.
A. Specification and Data
Following Grossman (1981) and Urich and Wachtel (1981), the usual
efficient markets model is initially used to estimate theresponse of
interest rates to weekly money announcements. This model ——whichis— 24—
exhibitedin Table 1 ——isestimated for both the federal funds rate and
the 3—month Treasury bill yield. Under the null hypothesis of market
efficiency, both the coefficient on the expected announced change in
money and the constant should equal zero.
The data used in estimating the response of interest rates to
money announcement surprises span the periods indicated in the left—hand
column of Table 1. The dates correspond to money announcement days. The
first observation is for the money announcement on September 29, 1977,
and the last observation occurs on May 30, 1985.
The money stock data consist of announced weekly changes in the
narrowly defined money stock, in billions of dollars, as reported in the
Federal Reserve's H.6 release. Data for the expected announced change
in the money stock are based on the survey data compiled by Money Market
Services, Inc. These survey data, however, exhibit two potential pro-
blems. First, in the pre—October 1979 period, Grossman (1981) estimates
a significant additive bias for the survey data. Second, at times the
survey data were collected several days before the weekly money announce-
ment. To form an unbiased on informationally efficient measure of the
expected change in money, fitted values are taken from estimated equa-
tions of the form
Mt =c0+c1M+c2RTB+ u,
where iM =announcedchange in the money stock
=surveymeasure of the expected announced change
RTB =changein the 3—month Treasury bill yield from the first
daily observation following the previous money announce-
ment to the daily observation just before the current




The estimation results of equation (45) indicate several biases, includ-
ing a statistically significant intercept in the pre—October 1979 period
and an estimate ofc1 significantly greater than unity in the post—Febru-
ary 1984 period. In addition, the change in the Treasury bill yield
prior to the money announcement provided statistically significant inf or—
mation in the October 1979 —October1982 and October 1982 —February1984
periods. While the revised measure does not significantly change the
estimated responses of interest rates to money announcement surprises,
it reduces the statistical significance of expectedmoney in several of
the estimated equations.-'
The yield data are taken from the H.15 release, published by the
Federal Reserve. The change in the 3—month Treasury bill yield is mea-
sured from 3:30 P.M. on the day of a money announcement to3:3O P.M. on
the following business day. The change in the federal funds rate is
defined similarly, except that it is a daily—averaged figure. Neverthe-
less, it predominately reflects federal funds trading prior to 3:30 P.M.
Thus, any effects of money announcements ——whichare made at 4:10 P.M. ——
shouldbe reflected in the measured yields.
B. Estimation and Test Results
Estimation results of the efficient markets model for the federal
funds rate and the 3—month Treasury bill yield over four subperiods are
presented in Table 1. The estimated response of the federal funds rate
to money announcement surprises is not statistically significant in the
pre—October 1979 period, as expected under the FFR operating procedure.— 26—
Inthe October 1979 —October1982 period, the results indicate that the
federal funds rate increased 10 basis points in response to a positive
$1 billion money announcement surprise. This estimated response is con-
sistent with the NBR operating procedure. In the two post—October 1982
subperiods, the estimated response is once again insignificant. For the
October 1982 —February1984 period, this result suggests that the fed-
eral funds —discountrate spread was used in implementing the BR proce-
dure. The February 1984 —May1985 period is examined in more detail
below.
Estimation results for the 3—month Treasury bill yield indicate
that the response is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in
three of the four periods. The estimated response increases in the
October 1979 —October1982 period, and then declines in the subsequent
period. This pattern is consistent with that of the federal funds rate.
In the February 1984 —May1985 period, the response is insignificantly
different from zero. Again, this period is examined in more detail
below. Finally, the coefficient on expected money is statistically signi-
ficant at the 5 percent level in the October 1979 —October1982 period.
This result appears to be due to the measurement of the change in the
3—month Treasury bill yield over at least a 24—hour period rather than
the 1½—hour period used by Roley (l983).----' While this result, along
with the presence of statistically significant constant terms in some
regressions, is inconsistent with the efficient markets hypothesis, it
has no affect on the estimated responses to money announcement surprises.
In particular, the revised measure used for expected money is constructed
to be orthogonal to the money announcement surprise.— 27—
Changesin the interest—rate responses across differentmonetary
policy regimes are formally tested on the right—hand side of Table l.--"
For both the federal funds rate and the 3—month Treasury bill yield, the
estimated responses are significantly different at the 5 percent level
across the first three periods. In the post—February 1984 period, only
the 3—month Treasury bill yield response is significantly different from
that of the previous period. In this case, the adoption of CRRappar-
ently affected the estimated response, which is consistent with the theo-
retical model presented in the previous section.
1. Further Results for the Post—February 1984 Period
As indicated in the previous section, the standard empirical specification
used to investigate the response of interest rates may no longer be
appropriate. Instead, the response may depend on the particular week of
the two—week reserve maintenance period. This implication follows from
(42) for the NBR procedure under two—week CRR. For the BR procedure,
the possibility of different responses across weeks depends on whether the
BR procedure is more like the NBR or FFR procedures.
The response of interest rates to money announcement surprises under
CRR is estimated separately for the first and second weeks of reserve
maintenance periods in Table 2.22' For the federal funds rate, the
response to money announcement surprises in the second week is substantially
larger than that in the first week. The difference, however, is not statist-
ically significant at the 10 percent level. Combined with the results in
Table 1, this lack of significance suggests that the BR procedure is
essentially implemented using the federal funds rate—discount rate spread.
For the Treasury bill yield, the estimated responses to money announce—— 28—
mentsurprises again are uniformly insignificant at the 10 percent level.
The point estimates, however, exhibit a pattern similar to that of the
federal funds rate. The hypothesis that responses differ across the two—
week reserve maintenance period can nevertheless be rejected at the
10 percent level.
IV. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyzed the response of interest rates to money announce—
ment surprises under alternative Federal Reserve operating procedures
and reserve requirement systems. In the theoretical models developed,
not only changes in operating procedures, but also reserve requirement
systems, were found to potentially affect the response. Moreover, under
the current two—week contemporaneous reserve requirements (CRR) system
adopted in February 1984, the responses in the first and second weeks
of the two—week reserve maintenance period may differ.
The empirical results generally conformed to the predictions of
the theoretical models. The response of interest rates to money announce-
ment surprises increased following the introduction of the nonborrowed
reserves procedure in October 1979, and then declined following the
adoption of the borrowed reserves procedure in October 1982. Furthermore,
following the introduction of CRR in February 1984, the response of
the Treasury bill yield again changed significantly in comparison to
the response in the previous period.—29—
Footnotes
*Associate professor of finance, University of Washington, and
research associate, National Bureau of Economic Research. I am
grateful to Michael R. Darby, Robert H. Rasche, Gordon H. Sellon,
and Carl E. Walsh for helpful comments and to the National
Science Foundation (Grant No. SES—8408603) for research support.
1.Cornell (1983b) and Roley and Troll (1983) also discuss this hypo-
thesis. In examining the response of short—term interest rates to
unanticipated announced changes in measures of real economic acti-
vity directly, however, Roley and Troll (1983) do not find any
significant responses.
2.This policy rule differs from that proposed by Roley and Walsh
(1985) in that all deviations are expected to be offset for
o <A<1.Roley and Walsh (1985) allow the possibility that
some fraction of the deviation is accomodated, but in their
empirical results the corresponding parameter has an estimated value
of zero.
3.Roley and Walsh (1985) use the 13—week yield as the opportunity
cost of holding money, mainly due to the emphasis placed on term
structure effects. The same factors as before are important when
the federal funds rate replaces the 13—week yield.
4.A high degree of serial correlation also is evident in quarterly
money demand equations specified in level form without partial
adjustment. See Roley (1985b).
5. Because of the insignificant role of w under LRR, Roley and Walsh
(1985) assume w =0.
6.This property also is emphasized by LeRoy (1979) and Hetzel (1982).
Shock absorber effects and other effects originating on the asset
side of banks' portfolios are not captured in this simplified model
under LRR. See Carr and Darby (1981) and Judd and Scadding (1981).
Shocks to reserves do, however, play a role in the CRR versions of
the model.
7.To dampen the volatility of the federal funds rate over time, for
example, policytnakers may elect to set at a level different from
i. This adjustment in (12) is analogous to adding an additive
mean—zero stochastic term to the policy rule (1). This discretion-
ary term also is implicitly assumed to have an infinite variance so
that the public cannot infer Mt_2 from the current week's federal
funds rate. The discretionary components for the nonborrowed reserves
and borrowed reserves procedures are assumed to have the same property.
Alternatively, the results are essentially unchanged if it is assumed
that both policymakers and the public have the same information sets
and that Mt_2 is revealed to both groups at the time of the money
announcement.—30—
8.Some clarification concerning the timing implicit in themodel may
be useful. The model basically includes threeintra—weekly periods:
the period prior to the money announcement, themoney announcement
period, and the period following the money announcement whenv is
revealed. Similar timing is assumed in the subsequent CRR models.
To simplify the model, the response of the federal fundsrate,
i —i,represents both the change on the announcement day and the
change in the weekly average. If this distinction is instead taken
into account explicitly, the response of the federal fundsrate
under the nonborrowed reserves procedure discussed below woulddif-
fer byascalar.
9.To conidr the extreme case in which the aggregate demand for
reserves is known with certainty, the first term on the right—hand
side is dropped.
10. In particular, the interest reponsiveness of the demand formoney
is estimated to decline in the post—October 1979 period, coinciding
with th. rise in interest—rate volatility under the NBR procedure.
The link is further analyzed by Walsh (1984).
11. I am indhted to Carl Walsh for this observation.




13.The relative size of the LRR response (15) and theresponse in the
second week of the reserve maintenance period (42) depends on a
number of parameters.
14.For further details concerning the revised expectedmoney measure,
see Roley (1983). For a discussion of the relative merits of this
measure, see Hem (1985) and Roley (1985a).
15.Falk and Orazem (1985) report that with the unadjustedsurvey measure,
the statistical significance of expected money is not sensitive
to the interval used to measure the change in interest rates.
Using the revised measure for expected money, however, this
appears not to be the case.
16.To avoid potential problems associated with heteroscedasticity, the
equations in each of the periods are weighted by the reciprocals
of their estimated standard errors in the tests. The equations
also are specified without expected money.—31—
17.Interest rate responses also were estimated using the difference
between the logarithm of the announcedmoney stock and the logarithm
of the expected money stock. These specifications yielded results
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 2. Estimation
results also were obtained for specifications including expectedmoney.
In an equation with coefficients on money surprises and expected
money allowed to differ depending on the week of the reserve mainten-
ance period, the response of the federal funds rate to money
surprises was significant at the 10 percent level in the second week.
The hypothesis that the responses are the same, however, could not
be rejected at the 10 percent level.—32—
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RFF, RTB =changein the federal funds rate and the 3—month Treasury
bill yield, respectively, from 3:30 P.M. on the day of
the money announcement to 3:30 P.M. on the following busi-
ness day (Source: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, H.15).
UN =moneyannouncement surprise, defined as tM —EM,where
tM is the announced change in the narrowly defined money
stock, in billions of dollars (Source: Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, H.6).
EM =expectedannounced change in the narrowly defined money
stock, based on the survey measure provided by Money Mar-
ket Services, Inc.
=randomerror term.
=multiplecorrelation coefficient connected for degrees of
freedom.
SE =standarderror.
Sl,S2,S3,S4 =sampleperiods 1, 2, 3, and 4.
F(n,m) =F—statisticwith n and m degrees of freedom, respectively.TABLE 2
Response of Interest Rates to Money Announcements Under CRR
AR =+ 11tl+i2•UMt2
+
CoefficientEstimates Summary Statistics H0:81112
Dependent
Variable 11 12 SE DW F(n,m)
ARFF 0.1267 0.0026 0.0351 -.00 .25 1.65 0.70
(0.0300) (0.0294) (0.0252) (1,67)
ARTB 0.0052 —0.0006 0.0019 —.03 .09 1.86 0.03
(0.0114) (0.0112) (0.0096) (1,67)
Notes: For further variable definitions, see the notes in Table 1. The
subscripts ti and t2 denote the first and second weeks of reserve
maintenance periods, respectively. UMtl, for example, takes values
equal to UM for the first week of reserve maintenance periods, and
zero otherwise.